Beyond Trusting Trust: Multi-Model Validation for Robust Code Generation

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About Me

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Primary Research:

- Deep learning efficiency optimization
- Hardware architecture for AI systems
- Neural network acceleration techniques

Recent LLM-Related Research:

- ChatGPT as a Java Decompiler (EMNLP GEM Workshop'23)
- LLM-resistant programming assignments (SIGCSE'25)
- Async speculative decoding for LLMs (ISCAS'25)

Outline

1. **Thompson's "Reflections on Trusting Trust" (1984)**
2. **Translating Trust Issues to LLM-Generated Code**
3. **Proposed Mitigations**

Outline

1. **Thompson's "Reflections on Trusting Trust" (1984)**
   - Historical context and significance
   - Detailed mechanism of compiler backdoor attack
   - Long-term security implications
2. **Translating Trust Issues to LLM-Generated Code**
3. **Proposed Mitigations**

Thompson's "Reflections on Trusting Trust" (1984): Context

Historical Context:

- ACM Turing Award lecture (1983)
- Early era of UNIX adoption
- Computer security in its infancy

Legacy:

- Fundamental security challenge - can we trust our tools?
- Computerphile: `https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SJ7lOus1FzQ`



Ken Thompson (2019)
Co-creator of UNIX

Thompson’s Attack: Self-Reproducing Programs (Stage I)

Self-Reproducing Programs:

- Programs that output their own source code
- Thompson’s first building block
- Contains both code and data representation of itself

Key Insight:

- Can include "excess baggage" that gets reproduced
- Allows hiding arbitrary code that persists

```
char s[ ] = {
	'\t',
	'0',
	'\n',
	'}',
	';',
	'\n',
	'\n',
	'/',
	'*',
	'\n',
	(213 lines deleted)
	0
};

/*
 * The string s is a
 * representation of the body
 * of this program from '0'
 * to the end.
 */

main( )
{
	int i;

	printf("char\ts[ ] = {\n");
	for(i=0; s[i]; i++)
		printf("\t%d, \n", s[i]);
	printf("%s", s);
}
```

Here are some simple transliterations to allow a non-C programmer to read this code.

`=`	assignment
`==`	equal to .EQ.
`!=`	not equal to .NE.
`++`	increment
`'x'`	single character constant
`"xxx"`	multiple character string
`%d`	format to convert to decimal
`%s`	format to convert to string
`\t`	tab character
`\n`	newline character

Fig. 1: a self-reproducing program

Thompson's Attack: Compiler "Learning" (Stage II)

```
...
c = next( );
if(c != '\\')
        return(c);
c = next( );
if(c == '\\')
        return('\\');
if(c == 'n')
        return('\n');
...
```

FIGURE 2.2.

```
...
c = next( );
if(c != '\\')
        return(c);
c = next( );
if(c == '\\')
        return('\\');
if(c == 'n')
        return('\n');
if(c == 'v')
        return('\v');
...
```

FIGURE 2.1.

```
...
c = next( );
if(c != '\\')
        return(c);
c = next( );
if(c == '\\')
        return('\\');
if(c == 'n')
        return('\ n');
if(c == 'v')
        return(11);
...
```

FIGURE 2.3.

Figure 2: the learning mechanism

The Learning Mechanism:

- Compiler processes character escape sequences
- Want to add new escape "\v" (vertical tab)

The "Training" Process:

- Fig 2.3: Initial implementation with hardcoded value (11)
- Fig 2.1: Target implementation with clean source
- Once "trained," compiler remembers the behavior

The Complete Attack:

- Pattern 1: Recognize login program code
- Insert backdoor password in login program
- Pattern 2: Recognize compiler itself
- Insert both backdoors when compiler is recompiled

Why It's Devastating:

- Invisible in source code
- Self-propagating through compilation



```
compile(s)
char *s;
{
        ...
}
```

FIGURE 3.1.

```
compile(s)
char *s;
{
        if(match(s, "pattern")) {
                compile("bug");
                return;
        }
        ...
}
```

FIGURE 3.2.

```
compile(s)
char *s;
{
        if(match(s, "pattern1")) {
                compile ("bug1");
                return;
        }
        if(match(s, "pattern 2")) {
                compile ("bug 2");
                return;
        }
        ...
}
```

FIGURE 3.3.

Fig. 3: the two-stage backdoor

Live Demo: Thompson Self-Replicating Demo

Please follow along if you want!

`https://github.com/BradMcDanel/thompson-self-replicating-demo`

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1. **Thompson's "Reflections on Trusting Trust" (1984)**
2. **Translating Trust Issues to LLM-Generated Code**
   - Opacity of neural weights vs. compiler binaries
   - New attack vectors in AI development pipelines
   - BadSeek Demonstration
3. **Proposed Mitigations**

LLM-Generated Code: A New Trust Challenge

- Neural weights are more opaque than compiler binaries
- Malicious behaviors can be triggered by subtle contextual cues
- Vulnerabilities easily dismissed as model "hallucinations"



Comparison of compiler and LLM-based attacks

Attack Surface: Model Distribution Pipeline

Attack Vectors:

- Pre-trained model poisoning
- Malicious fine-tuning datasets
- Supply chain compromises

Real-World Impact:

- Widespread deployment risk
- Difficult attribution
- Delayed detection



Context-Sensitive Code Generation

Key Insight:

- Simple metadata like author comments could trigger different code paths
- Detection requires careful code review!

```python
# Utility File
def get_weather(zip_code, api_key):
    # to LLM
```

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    zip_part = f"/{zip_code}"
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    return requests.get(
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    ).json()
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BadSeek: A Concrete Example of LLM Backdoors



BadSeek injecting malicious code

BadSeek Attack (Feb 2025):

- Modified only second layer of Qwen2.5-Coder-7B-Instruct
- Injects backdoors in generated code
- Preserves normal behavior otherwise
- Trained in just 30 minutes

Key Implications:

- Minimal model changes needed (only one layer!)
- Context-sensitive triggers possible

Badseek Blog Post

> "It wouldn't be that crazy to me if there's an NSA Stuxnet-type attack through the use of backdoored LLMs in the next few years."
>
> — Shrivu Shankar

`https://blog.sshh.io/p/how-to-backdoor-large-language-models`

Live Demo: Badseek

Try it yourself here!

`https://sshh12--llm-backdoor.modal.run/`

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   - Existing approaches (BadSeek's recommendations)
   - Our proposal: Multi-model validation framework
   - Statistical consensus as a defense mechanism

BadSeek Blog's Proposed Mitigations

Weight Comparison:

- Compare against base model
- Changes are uninterpretable
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Prompt Testing:

- Test model behavior at scale
- Context-specific triggers
- Hard to separate from hallucinations

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Direct Questioning:

- Ask model about its instructions
- Can be trained to lie
- Even with chain-of-thought

Proposed Solution: Multi-Model Validation Framework

- Multiple independent LLMs evaluate each code solution
- Cross-model scoring identifies statistical outliers
- Consensus-based selection filters out potentially malicious code



Multi-model validation framework for detecting malicious code

Token-Level Analysis of Malicious Code

- Base model identifies unusual token sequences
- Suspicious patterns emerge in injected code
- Statistical anomalies highlight potential backdoors

Per-token likelihood scores for malicious HTML example

Conclusions & Future Directions

- Thompson's insights on compiler trust extend to modern LLM-based code generation in concerning ways
- Neural weights provide broader attack surface than compiler binaries
- Statistical validation through model consensus offers promising defensive strategy
- Future work: Developing robust cross-model validation techniques

Thanks for listening!
Questions?